Running head: THE NULLIFERS AND HISTORY

“Historically as Certain as Our Revolution Itself”: The Nullifiers and History

William Hopchak

A Senior Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for graduation
in the Honors Program
Liberty University
Fall 2014

1

THE NULLIFIERS AND HISTORY

Acceptance of Senior Honors Thesis
This Senior Honors Thesis is accepted in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for graduation from the
Honors Program of Liberty University.

______________________________
Carey Roberts, Ph.D.
Thesis Chair

______________________________
Samuel Smith, Ph.D.
Committee Member

______________________________
Branson Woodard, D.A.
Committee Member

______________________________
James H. Nutter, D.A.
Honors Director

______________________________
Date

2

3

THE NULLIFIERS AND HISTORY
Abstract
Despite the common defamation of the states’ rights theories acted upon in the
Nullification Crisis of 1832, there exists a great deal of historical support for the

nullifiers’ positions. Nullifiers believed in a decentralized constitutional system, while
nationalists believed in a centralized constitutional system. This tension between central
and decentralized positions had been at issue in the American struggle for independence
though the exact manner in which these problems manifested themselves was different in
the two events. The states’ rights ideas championed primarily by John C. Calhoun were
consistent with American political tradition. At the most basic level, the Nullification
Crisis was over a disparity between constitutional interpretations. However, a
demonstration of the existence of such issues in the American Revolution and the
implications of those forces on the early republic demonstrate that the Nullifiers’
positions were consistent with history and traditional American resistance to centralized
power.
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“Historically as Certain as Our Revolution Itself”: The Nullifiers and History
Few today have taken the doctrines of nullification championed by John C.
Calhoun seriously. Modern scholarship tends to dismiss the strong states rights position
adopted by the South as mere contrivances designed to protect slavery, and the 1860s saw
the violent repudiation of such doctrines. Violence nearly erupted thirty years earlier in
1833 when most of the political establishment arrayed itself against Calhoun and the
South Carolina nullifiers. However, a fair and careful historical analysis of Calhoun’s
argument reveals that the nullifiers acted reasonably and logically in accordance with
historical precedents established during the war for independence. As a result any critique
should focus on the nullifier’s perception of their situation, abstract questions of political
science, or the mere practicality of Calhoun’s proposed system.
A great deal of continuity and similarity exists between the American struggle for
independence and the Nullification Crisis of 1832. While independence mainly involved
questions of sovereignty, in both a disparity of constitutional interpretations centered on
questions of where exactly sovereignty resided in the constitutional system and whether a
centralized unitary system or a dispersed system existed. In England during the 1760s and
1770s, most believed Parliament to be sovereign and that a unitary nation of some sort
existed under the sovereignty of that parliament and was represented in it. The colonies,
however, were in the process of developing a view of the English Constitution that was
much more federal in nature. Thus, there was a direct conflict between a decentralized
and consolidated vision of the empire. A similar disparity of constitutional interpretation
came to a head in the Nullification Crisis of 1832 when South Carolina acted upon a
decentralized conception of the Union in response to centralizing tendencies.
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A definitional diversion must be made before beginning in earnest. Donald
Livingston, Professor Emeritus at Emory University, identified “two ideal conceptions of
legitimate political order,” from the early modern era.1 The first and pre-dominant one he
refers to as “Hobbesian” or the “modern unitary state,” and the other he calls the
“Althusian” or the “modern federated polity.” The first model is “composed of
egotistically motivated individuals who contract to form a sovereign office to rule for the
sake of peace and stability.” Though, Livingston refers to the first model as “Hobbesian”
after Thomas Hobbs’ exposition of such a theory in Leviathan (1651), he intends the term
as a broad label. For example, Livingston includes Locke’s political theory under this
label as well because, despite the libertarian flavor, Locke propounded the same basic
system Hobbs did. For Livingston any system that supposes man began in a state of
nature and contracted to create society, government, and sovereignty falls into this broad
category. “Hobbesian” serves as a convenient label for consolidated, centralized, unitary
systems not merely the version of it propounded by Hobbes. The second model, named
for Johannes Althusius, author of a treatise on political theory entitled Politica “root[s]
political order… in social bonds and duties.” It conceives of sovereignty as a “symbiotic
relation among… independent social orders.” This system believes society to exist
independent of and prior to government. Sovereignty then is vested in the societies that
create government.2 These two positions are drastically different in both presuppositions
and implications. The Hobbesian model consolidates power in a sovereign center, while
the Althusian model disperses power throughout the component parts of a polity or
system of polities. These two fundamental positions manifested themselves in the
1

Donald W. Livingston, "The very Idea of Secession," Society 35, no. 5 (July 1998), 38.

2
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disparate constitutional positions of the 1770s and 1830s, and these positions will be
referred to in these terms.
In July of 1776, thirteen colonies denounced their monarch and separated
themselves from the British Empire. This was no sudden action; a decade long debate
regarding the power of Parliament and the very nature of the British Empire preceded it.
Over the course of this debate American views shifted from a carefully defined
subordination to Parliament to an understanding of the Empire as a system of confederate
polities. Ultimately, this contest of strength among parts of the empire convinced
colonists of designs against their liberties and climaxed in the Declaration of
Independence.
An example of constitutional contest occurred in Massachusetts during 1762. A
dispute arose between the Massachusetts House of Representatives and Massachusetts’s
Royal Governor Francis Bernard. In response to reports of a privateer endangering
Massachusetts fishing vessels, Governor Bernard outfitted a war ship and informed the
House of his actions when they came in session. The House of Representatives did not
condone the Governor’s actions, as he expected; rather they censured him. The thrust of
their argument was that he had acted unconstitutionally in outfitting a ship and allocating
funds to defray the expenses of the expedition without the consent of the House of
Representatives. A line from the censure read, “It is in effect taking from the house their
most darling privilege, the right of originating all Taxes.”3 It later added a rhetorical
flourish: “for it would be of little consequence to the people whether they were subject to
George or Lewis, the King of Great Britain or the French King, if both were arbitrary, as
3

James Otis, A Vindication of the Conduct of the House of Representatives of the Province of the
Massachusetts-Bay: More Particularly, in the Last Session of the General Assembly (Boston: Edes & Gill
in Queen St, 1762), 7.
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both would be if both could levy Taxes without Parliament.”4 Governor Bernard
eventually dismissed the legislature before the argument had been settled. Choosing not
to wait till the next House session to continue the argument, Representative James Otis
wrote a tract entitled A Vindication of the Conduct of the House of Representatives of the
Province of the Massachusetts-Bay.
The argument, both in session and in Otis’s pamphlet, revealed several things.
First was the obvious fear of arbitrary power. The official censure of the government
explicitly stated that fear of arbitrary power motivated House jealousy over finances:
“And when once the representatives of a people give up this privilege, the government
will very soon become arbitrary.”5 Otis concluded that because the House had the power
to tax, there existed an implicit limit upon the Governor and Council’s ability to use
money in the treasury. He asserted that a House Act specifically permitting spending was
necessary for the Governor or Council to use public money.6 A Vindication demonstrated
that the colonists held strong opinions regarding the power of their assemblies to tax and
defended those rights against intrusions of arbitrary power.
Second, A Vindication demonstrated the high regard colonists had for the King.
Otis asserted that, “the British constitution as now established in his Majesty’s person and
family, is the wisest and best in the world.”7 He continued, “The King of Great-Britain is
the best as well as most glorious Monarch upon the Globe, and his subjects the happiest

4
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in the universe.”8 This was not mere rhetoric; professor of history at Boston University
Brendan McConville observed that the colonies were far more enthusiastic in their
loyalty to the King than the people of England were.9 Third, A Vindication provided
insight into Otis’s view of the constitutional position of the colonies within the empire.
Speaking of what he believed to be the “last resort” for a colonial assembly when conflict
arises with the governor, Otis wrote, “I mean as we are a dependent government, a dutiful
and humble remonstrance to his Majesty.”10 This statement acknowledges the supremacy
of the Crown and Parliament over the colonies. He asserted that Parliament alone had the
right to an “appeal to Heaven, and the longest sword” when the King overstepped his
bounds.11 However, he also articulated a view of the colonial assemblies as parallel to
Parliament within their jurisdiction.12 The colonists understood the governor as the
King’s agent, his council as an equivalent to the House of Lords, and colonial assemblies
as equivalent to the House of Commons. 13 Just as the commons did in England, the
houses controlled the purse strings in the colonies, and both bodies acted as checks on the
King’s prerogative as exercised through the governor. It was only a matter of time before
the view of colonial assemblies as analogous to Parliament expanded to include the right
to armed opposition against usurpations of their power, or as Otis phrased it, “an appeal
to “the longest sword.”
8
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While those like Otis saw legislative checks on the governor as a positive thing,
some in the colonies and most in England believed that the assemblies were the branches
of government that were overreaching. They believed that the lower houses existed at the
king’s pleasure and need not exist to maintain the rights of the colonists. Thus, an
assembly that managed to limit the governor had not checked power but rather usurped
Royal prerogative.14 It was widely believed that the assemblies had limited power and
were to function as an organ for internal management of the colonies, but that the will of
the king in counsel was the law for the colonies.15 These interpretational issues that had
been limited to small debates between assemblies and colonial governors would be taken
to another dimension in the mid 1760’s when the debate between the colonies and
Parliament began.
The grand constitutional debate began in earnest when, in response to the Stamp
Act, many of the colonies sent representatives to what has been named the Stamp Act
Congress. This congress produced the Declaration of Rights (1765), which expressed
similar themes as those in Otis’s Vindication. The first point of the declaration pledged
allegiance to king and “all due subordination to that august body, the Parliament of Great
Britain,” demonstrating widespread loyalty toward the king and recognition of
Parliamentary supremacy.16 In subsequent points the delegates constructed an argument
against the Stamp Act grounded in the right of Englishmen not to be taxed without their
consent. The third points states, “That it is inseparably essential to the freedom of a
14

Ibid., 33.
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people, and the undoubted rights of Englishmen, that no taxes should be imposed on
them, but with their own consent, given personally, or by their representatives.”17 Here in
almost as many words is the remembered rallying cry of the Revolution: “No taxation
without representation.”
The language of this document brings to mind the argument James Otis expressed
a year earlier in The Rights of the British Colonists Asserted and Proved (1764). In this
pamphlet Otis allowed that the colonies were “subject to and dependent on Great Britain;
and that therefore as over subordinate governments, the parliament of Great-Britain has
an undoubted power and lawful authority to make acts for the general good.”18
Continuing, he asserted, “The supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his
property, without his consent in person, or by representation.”19 Otis concluded that it is
entirely unjust for Parliament to tax the colonies, as they are not represented in that body
and “if a man is not his own assessor in person, or by deputy, his liberty is gone, or lay
entirely at the mercy of others.”20 Both of these documents acknowledged Parliamentary
supremacy over the colonies and a right to general legislation, but also explicitly denied
the power of Parliament to tax the colonies, as that was an explicit violation of the right
of an individual to give consent to taxes in person or by a representative.
The British of course disagreed with this assertion of colonial rights. Though
forced to repeal the Stamp Act, Parliament expressed in the Declaratory Act its opinion
on the colonial assemblies’ exclusive right to taxation. The act states that the colonial
17
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legislatures’ claims were illegal. It also argued that the various “votes, resolutions, and
orders, derogatory to the legislative authority of parliament” were inconsistent with
colonial “dependence” upon Britain.21 The Act’s titular declaration asserts that the king
and Parliament had full authority “to make laws and statutes of sufficient force and
validity to bind the colonies and people of America, subjects of the crown of Great
Britain, in all cases whatsoever.”22
Parliament rested its claim to power over the colonies upon the theory of virtual
representation as articulated by Thomas Whateley a year before the Stamp Act’s
adoption. Whateley, a Parliamentary deputy of Lord Greeneville, prepared a book length
argument for virtual representation in order to head off questions regarding the legitimacy
of Parliamentary measures to raise internal revenues in the colonies, prior the passage of
the Stamp Act.23 This is the source of the basic argument that the colonists were in fact
represented in Parliament in the same manner any non-voting Englishmen was
represented in Parliament:
The Fact is, that the Inhabitants of the Colonies are represented in Parliament;
they do not indeed choose the Members of that Assembly; neither are Nine Tenths
of the People of Britain Electors… All British Subjects are really in the same;
none are actually, all are virtually represented in Parliament; for every Member of
Parliament sits in the House, not as Representative of his own Constituents, but as
one of the august Assembly by which all the Commons of Great Britain are
represented… but as it is, they and the Colonies and all British Subjects whatever,
have an equal Share in the general Representation of the Commons of Great
Britain, and are bound by the Consent of the Majority of that House, whether their

21

An Act for the Better Securing the Dependency of His Majesty’s Dominion in America upon the
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own particular Representatives consented to or opposed the Measure there taken,
or whether they had not particular Representatives there.24
This constitutional interpretation of the empire and the rules of Parliament in turn rested
upon a conception of the English Empire as a unitary nation state.
That virtual representation rested upon a unitary state model is no mere
summation. Whateley, earlier in his book, explicitly stated as much: “The British Empire
in Europe and in America is still the same Power: Its subjects in both are still the same
People: and all equally participate in the Adversity or Prosperity of the whole.”25 He
argued that the colonies and Britain shared mutual interests thus implying the existence
of a single community with a single government. He stated, “It is an indisputable
Consequence of their being thus one Nation, that they must be governed by the same
supreme Authority, be subject to one executive Power in the King, to one legislative
Power in the Parliament of Great-Britain.”26 Finally, he concluded, “Their Connection
would otherwise be an Alliance, not a Union; and they would be no longer one State, but
a Confederacy of many.”27 No clearer declaration of a Hobbesian concept of the state is
possible. Clearly, Parliament was approaching the constitutional debate from a
consolidated, unitary-state perspective.
Though, they acknowledged Parliamentary supremacy, colonists balked at the
Stamp Act and the theories used attempting to justify it. This is because, while
acknowledging their own dependent status, they maintained claims on certain rights that

24

Thomas Whateley, The Regulations Lately Made Concerning the Colonies and Taxes Imposed
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served to limit Parliamentary supremacy. Chief amongst these was the right to be taxed
only by their own representatives. While an individual right, it could only exist if
“collective” or community rights were protected, because as colonists saw it, they were
represented only in their local assemblies. For the colonists, this essentially meant that
their assemblies’ sole powers of taxation had to be maintained, because allowing
Parliamentary taxation was equivalent to surrendering liberty due to the lack of colonial
representation in that body. This demonstrates the interplay between two principles, the
first being that representation was necessary to taxation, the second being that separate
communities existed. The emphasis colonists placed upon their collective rights
embodied in their legislatures clearly indicates that Whateley’s arguments regarding the
unitary nature of the empire were not accepted in the colonies. This disparity of
interpretation served as a frame for future struggles pitching the community rights of the
colonies against the claims of Parliament.28
Round two of the debate came after Parliament passed the Townshend Acts in
another attempt to raise revenue in the colonies. In his Letters From a Farmer in
Pennsylvania John Dickinson argued against the right to Parliamentary taxation of the
colonies while allowing Parliamentary supremacy. Discussing the Townshend duties, he
said, “the Parliament unquestionably possesses a legal authority to regulate the trade of
Great Britain, and all her colonies.”29 He believed such authority was necessary and
dismissed any arguments to the contrary. Dickinson wrote that Parliament had a right to
regulate trade and that the incidental raising of revenue through duties designed to
28

Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, The Fall of the First British Empire: Origins of
the War of American Independence (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 161-163.
29
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regulate was not a violation of rights. However, he affirmed the illegality of taxation
without representation.30 Observing that the Townshend Acts were designed specifically
to raise revenue, Dickinson stated, “This I call an innovation: and a most dangerous
innovation.”31 He believed it so dangerous because it was a blatant attempt to raise
revenue without the consent of those taxed. Dickinson grounded the principle of no
taxation without representation in the traditional understanding of taxes as a free gift of
the people to their sovereign. With this foundation established he affirmed the sixth point
of the Stamp Act Congress Declaration of Resolves: “it is unreasonable, and inconsistent
with the principles and spirit of the British constitution, for the people of Great Britain to
grant to his Majesty the property of the colonies.”32 There is an implicit distinction
between the “people of Great Britain” and the “colonies.” The “colonies” must mean the
people or peoples of the colonies. The English Parliament was unable to tax the colonies
because the tax was no longer a free gift of the people if another people coerced it from
them. Dickinson’s letters articulate essentially the same view of the colonies that Otis did
in 1762, but the continued debate was on the verge of causing a significant shift in
thinking.
These arguments fostered a belief that the Empire was a system of confederated
polities. Though less popular, some held to the confederated polities view as early as the
1760s. It had risen to prominence by the 1770s. 33 Normally considered a nationalist, even

30
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John Dickinson, “Letter IV,” in Empire and Nation: Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania
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33
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Alexander Hamilton expressed such an opinion in his “The Farmer Refuted.” He argued
that there was a right to self-government: “for civil liberty cannot possibly have any
existence where the society for whom laws are made have no share in making them.”34
His use of the word society here is another indicator of the colonial American emphasis
upon community rather than strictly the individual. By a detailed examination of the
various colonial charters and former colonial interactions with Parliament, Hamilton
argued that the colonies were “entirely discordant with that sovereignty of Parliament.”35
Elsewhere he claimed that, “ the voice of nature, the spirit of the British constitution, and
the charters of the colonies in general” opposed parliamentary supremacy over the
colonies.36 The one allowance made for Parliamentary authority was the right to regulate
external trade. His veneration for custom necessitated this concession, as the colonies had
permitted such actions since the Navigation Acts of the seventeenth century. Ultimately
his position was that the British Empire consisted of a multiplicity of polities united in a
common sovereign but independent of one another in regard to internal affairs.
Jefferson articulated a very similar conception of the British Empire in his
Summary View of the Rights of British America (1774). He argues that the original
settlers of the American colonies had acted upon the basic human right to emigration and
had established new societies in the wilds of North America separate from England.37

34

Alexander Hamilton, “The Farmer Refuted,” in The Revolutionary Writings of Alexander
Hamilton, ed. Richard B. Vernier, 1775, (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2008),
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These societies, presumed Jefferson, were under no obligation to maintain associations
with England:
[but] the emigrants thought proper to adopt that system of laws under which they
had hitherto lived in the mother country, and to continue their union with her by
submitting themselves to the same common sovereign, who was thereby made the
central link connecting the several parts of the empire thus newly multiplied.38
Elsewhere in his pamphlet, Jefferson refered to both Parliament and colonial legislatures
as “free and independent legislature[s].”39 He also spoke of “the addition of new states to
the British Empire [producing] an addition of new, and sometimes opposite interests;” he
saw it as the King’s duty to act as a mediator between these interests.40 More significantly
the assertion of separate interests further supports the distinct nature of the multiple
polities constituting the British Empire. Building on the concept of multiple communities
existing within the British Empire, he asserted that, “from the nature of things, every
society must at all times possess within itself the sovereign powers of legislation.”41
Jefferson concluded by arguing that the King was in fact the servant of the people in
whom real sovereignty actually resided and calling upon the King to act as a fair
mediator between the different peoples of the empire.42
Hamilton and especially Jefferson articulated in these documents a theory of the
British Empire that was thoroughly Althusian. As they saw it, each colony was equal to
Britain and the empire was a sort of federated polity joined by a single executive power
in the King. This stands in stark and obvious contrast to the position of empire articulated
38
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by Whateley in 1765. The years of debate caused Americans to fully develop an
Althusian position, and though this thoroughly federal view had to develop, the fact that
it did develop logically from previously held positions suggests that the colonists had
never been too fundamentally Hobbesian in their thinking. The underpinning belief that
led Americans to accept this anti-Hobbesian theory of empire was that a people held
certain powers upon which no other entity may infringe. Thus, their earliest rejection of
Parliamentary taxation was an indication that they believed themselves different political
communities, the seed of the fully developed Althusian conceptions presented by
Hamilton and Jefferson.43 In such a view, the recent Parliamentary incursions against
colonial legislatures were completely unjustifiable.
The proliferation of the interpretation that placed colonial assemblies on par with
Parliament ensured a continued struggle. It is critical to understand that there had been a
shift in constitutional organization after the Glorious Revolution that was not embraced in
the colonies. When Parliament replaced the king in the Glorious Revolution a precedent
of Parliamentary supremacy was set. In English eyes Parliament assumed all prerogatives
formerly held by the king. Thus Parliament now had every right to legislate for the
colonies.44 The colonists however, never accepted Parliamentary supremacy and
maintained a remarkable attachment to the king.45 In fact, the colonies held very high
views of the king throughout the entire colonial period and appealed to him to protect

43
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them from the overreaching Parliament. The Declaration of Rights of the Stamp Act
Congress began, “The members of this congress, sincerely devoted, with the warmest
sentiments of affection and duty to His Majesty’s person and government, inviolably
attached to the present happy establishment of the Protestant succession.”46 The Olive
Branch Petition addressed George III as “Most Gracious Sovereign,” and described the
colonists as “Your majesty’s most faithful subjects.”47 Though, to a degree these are
stock phrases, their sincerity is suggested by the extremely high view of the king held by
most colonists. The colonies had even come to hold a sort of “neodivine right” view of
the king.48 While he was understood to have limits on his prerogative, the king was
thought of as the Lord’s anointed and somewhat above mere men.49 A belief in the divine
appointment of the king helped maintain his high esteem and perceived superiority to
Parliament.50 This veneration of the king undoubtedly helped with the proliferation of an
Althusian view of imperial organization.
While historians can see that it was this dichotomy of constitutional interpretation
that led to the war, colonists came to see the situation as more than a legal debate. Since
colonist held that the king was at the top of the imperial institutional structure, they could
not conceive of a justification for Parliamentary intervention in their affairs. The
colonists’ deep seated fear of arbitrary power predisposed them to interpret the continued
attempts by Parliament to tax and legislate for the colonies as a deliberate attempt to

46
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usurp authority, rather than the outworking of constitutional changes begun by the
Glorious Revolution. 51
The Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up Arms (1775) plainly
articulates such a belief: “The legislature of Great-Britain … stimulated by an inordinate
passion for a power not only unjustifiable, but what they know to be peculiarly
reprobated by the very constitution of that kingdom… attempted to effect their cruel and
impolitic purpose of enslaving these colonies by violence.”52 Clearly for the colonists, the
struggle moved past a mere legal debate. The Declaration includes a list of offenses such
as unjust taxation and the abolishment of trial by jury as evidence of Parliament’s
dastardly designs. It took greatest issue with the Declaratory Act because of its claims of
absolute power over the colonies.53 The colonists clearly believed that the Parliament was
trying to infringe upon American liberties.
However, even after the colonists had taken up arms against the army in Boston,
reconciliation was still desired. The colonists took a strong stance, but promised, “we
assure them that we mean not to dissolve that union which has so long and so happily
subsisted between us, and which we sincerely wish to see restored.”54 The colonists saw
themselves as having to choose between, “an unconditional submission to the tyranny of
irritated ministers, or resistance by force.”55 This document clearly revealed a colonial
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belief in a deliberate Parliamentarian effort to destroy liberty in the colonies, but loyalty
to the king had not yet been shaken.
The patriots, while intent upon defending their rights, did not seek independence
before, to their horror, they became convinced of the king’s complicity in the conspiracy.
His support of the Quebec Act, which established Catholicism in Quebec, was very
troubling to the vociferously anti-Catholic, Protestant colonies. The historical context of
Catholic Stuart tyranny and Catholic Jacobite conspiracies caused colonists to see this act
as a dangerous flirtation with Catholicism and tyranny.56 However, the final straw came
when the king considered his colonies to be in rebellion and employed “foreign
mercenaries” to subject them while they still beseeched him for protection.57 Convinced
that the king had joined with Parliament to usurp power and destroy liberty, the colonies
finally resorted to independence as they could conceive of no other way to preserve their
freedoms and rights. The Americans expressed their belief that the King-in-Parliament
had violated their constitutional rights in the Declaration of Independence.58 The
Declaration states, “When a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the
same object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it
is their duty, to throw off such government.”59 The colonists firmly believed that such
was their situation and listed myriad complaints against the king in the Declaration of
Independence.
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Independence from Britain did not bring with it consensus on constitutional
order.60 Rather, Hobbesian and Althusian conceptions of political order continued to be
pitted against each other. These two views waxed and waned in power as they struggled
against each other. During the early national period led by Hamilton, a centralized
conception of the union was ascendant. The Federalist implementation of the Alien and
Sedition Acts gave opportunity for a reassertion of Althusian doctrines. Though no other
states adopted them, the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of 1798 along with the
subsequent Virginia Report articulated a conception of union consistent with the
Althusian order described in Jefferson’s Summary View of the Rights of British America.
Though there are some exceptions, the presidency of Jefferson ushered in a time when
the Althusian conception as articulated in the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions was
dominant. However, the Supreme Court propagated nationalistic policies throughout the
period, especially in the eighteen-teens. In the 1820’s with the election of John Quincy
Adams and the increase of federally funded internal improvements, nationalism again
seemed to be dominating.
In response to nationalistic policies, a significant distrust of the central
government grew steadily in the south during the 1820s. The internal improvements
pushed during the Adams administration and nationalist decisions of the Marshall court
convinced many that the Constitution had become meaningless and that the federal
government would now do whatever it pleased.61 During this time, the south, was
becoming especially nervous of northern intentions and came to conceive of the north as
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a permanent majority bent on using the south for its own economic aggrandizement.62
The implementation of high tariffs in 1828 and 1832 convinced many in South Carolina
that centralization had gone too far. These attitudes of distrust and apprehension
prompted action. Though there were a multitude of leaders in the South Carolina
nullification movement, among them Thomas Cooper, George McDuffie, and William
Smith, the most prominent of these was John C. Calhoun. Calhoun was Jackson’s Vice
President until 1832, immediately before the nullification of the tariffs, and was
immediately elected Senator upon his resignation of the Vice Presidency. As the greatest
articulator and political theorist of the nullification movement, Calhoun authored an
official enumeration of grievances and a plan for nullification passed as resolutions by
the South Carolina legislature.63 Clarifying his positions and adding to the body of
thought on South Carolina’s grievances and proposed remedy, Calhoun also published an
open letter, remembered as “The Fort Hill Address”, explaining his position.
In 1832, South Carolina leaders acted upon the nullification theory they had been
developing for the last two years and nullified the federal tariffs of 1828 and 1832 they
believed unconstitutional and detrimental to South Carolina’s interests. This in turn
sparked a great deal of debate and caused both sides to begin posturing for a violent
clash. The ultimate resolution of this conflict is of little interest to the current question.
What matters here is the degree to which the nullifiers, and especially Calhoun as their
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greatest member, were true to their historical tradition. A careful examination of their
arguments and position in the context of the history already presented will demonstrate
that the nullification movement, while novel in the details of its plan, enjoyed the support
of tradition, precedent, and history.
Calhoun and South Carolina’s plan of action demonstrates an Althusian and
decentralized conception of the union. The South Carolina Exhibition, Calhoun argued
that in the event that the central government exercises powers not granted to it by the
Constitution, the states may legitimately counter that usurpation of power. This state
intervention was to be accomplished by a special convention.64 This convention acting as
the organ of the people of the state could choose to nullify, within the state’s borders, the
federal act in question. After such a convention, Calhoun propounded that the other states
may either affirm the act of nullification or affirm the nullified act by amending the
constitution to explicitly allow for the questioned power.65 This mechanism was how
Calhoun proposed protecting states from central government usurpation of power.
Calhoun grounded his nullification doctrine in an Althusian philosophy of the
state. In his masterwork, A Disquisition on Government, written in the 1840s, he
expressed his long held belief that man was a social being:
I assume, as an incontestable fact, that man is so constituted as to be a social
being. His inclinations and wants, physical and moral, irresistibly impel him to
associate with his kind; and he has, accordingly, never been found, in any age or
country, in any state other than the social. In no other, indeed, could he exist; and
in no other—were it possible for him to exist—could he attain to a full
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development of his moral and intellectual faculties, or raise himself, in the scale
of being, much above the level of the brute creation.66

To be in isolation from other humans was an unnatural state. This presupposition led him
to believe that governments were the creation of societies. Society maintained power over
the government in this view and never gave up the sovereignty it possessed in delegating
to government powers necessary to accomplish certain functions for the good of
society.67 Thus, he held an essentially Althusian conception of the state. In Politica
Althusius wrote:
Necessity therefore induces association; and the want of things necessary for life,
which are acquired and communicated by the help and aid of one’s associates,
conserves it. For this reason it is evident that the commonwealth, or civil society,
exists by nature, and that man is by nature a civil animal who strives eagerly for
association. If however, anyone wishes not to live in society, or needs nothing
because of his own abundance, he is not considered a part of the
commonwealth.68
Also in Politica, Althusius asserted “The Public association exists when many private
associations are linked together for the purpose of establishing an inclusive political
order.”69 The similarities between Althusius and Calhoun’s position are obvious. Both
placed sovereignty in organic societies and subjected government to society and its
interests. This conception of society combined with a belief that the American union was
a collection of separate peoples each maintaining their own sovereignty made it corollary
in Calhoun’s thought that any one state may authoritatively counter an action of the
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central government. However, he should not be seen as an opponent to popular
sovereignty. Rather he supported popular sovereignty at the level of the community
rather than simple majority rule by the entire population of the union. A majority of
political communities would provide for the protection of community rights, but simple
majoritarianism allowed for the abuse of minorities too easily and ignored the existence
and rights of communities.70
Nationalists viciously attacked this theory. They held that sovereignty resided in
the people as a whole.71 This view was essentially similar to that expressed by the
Parliament in the struggle for independence. While different in the trappings, it was a
Hobbesian conception of the state. Proponents of this centralized position claimed
Americans were all one people, just as Thomas Whateley had claimed regarding subjects
of the British Empire. A basic tenet of social contract theory is that once individuals have
entered into the social compact, no minority may legitimately resist the will of the
majority.72 Thus, if ultimate power rested in the people as a whole, than the central
government was supreme and the states were essentially administrative districts of the
government in Washington, incapable of acting independently against oppressive federal
actions. Calhoun and the other nullifiers though denied that a single American people
joined by social contract existed. If, as they argued, the constitution only established a
strong confederation of several peoples, each maintaining sovereignty within itself, then
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the central government was merely a creature of the states.73 In such an arrangement the
states were justified in nullifying acts of the central government that violated the
Constitution.
All attempts to settle the question of whether America was constituted by a single
or by several peoples, and thus discover the answer to that question’s corollary
implications on state power, began with historical inquiry of the nation’s founding.74
President Jackson took an ardently nationalistic stance on this issue.75 He issued a formal
declaration to the people of South Carolina in which he laid out a nationalist
interpretation of American history. It stated, “the people of the United States formed the
Constitution, … the terms used in its construction show it to be a government in which
the people of all the states collectively are represented,” thus implying that there existed a
single American people.76 Jackson’s understanding of the United States as a single nation
rather than a confederation stems from his belief that as far back as the colonial period,
the colonies had viewed themselves as a single nation and had entered into alliances
together as a unit.77 He believed strongly that the implicit unity of colonial America was
made explicit by the Constitution and that any attempt at secession or nullification was
completely illegitimate, as it would require one part of the nation to violate its obligations
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to the whole.78 Given Jackson’s strongly nationalistic interpretation of the union’s origin,
he obviously could not allow Calhoun’s doctrines.
Among the many other nationalist sources that could be cited Benjamin Romaine
an attorney and native New Yorker is one of the most interesting since he was a veteran
of the War for Independence and a prominent New York politician. He expressed views
similar to Jackson’s, arguing that the states had sought to replace the sovereignty of
England with a new body during the struggle for Independence, and that the “Whole
People” was the body upon which such power had come to rest. He also emphasized the
transition from the Articles of Confederation, which had recognized state power, to the
Constitution of 1787, which begins, “We The People of the United States.”79 Romaine
argued that if there had been a common understanding that states had a veto prerogative,
state Constitutions would mention this power, and since none did, no such power
existed.80
An authority on the historical development of the United States, James Madison
was likely the nullifier’s loftiest opponent. He did not believe in a single, organic
American people, but rather that the Constitution had acted as a sort of social contract to
create a single people for certain purposes out of the separate political communities of the
several states. However, he believed that this compact left the states independent for
purposes regarding internal concerns. He believed that nullifiers were attempting to
redefine the nature of the regime and asserted that the Constitution, and with it the new
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federal republic, was created not by the states but by the people.81 Madison held that the
adoption of the Constitution by conventions indicated that the people, not the states,
established the Constitution; if the states had created the central government, then the
state legislatures would have ratified the Constitution.82 According to Madison,
nullification theory was unconstitutional and unnecessary, because the Constitution
already established a system of arbitration in the judiciary. Essentially, he believed that if
the nullifiers had their way, the nation would be returned to the unstable and dangerous
condition it had been in under the Articles.83
This nationalistic onslaught did not dissuade the nullifiers, though. Calhoun wrote
that his nullification doctrine “rest[ed] on facts historically as certain as our revolution
itself.”84 Nullifiers believed their position regarding sovereignty was consistent with the
development of the nation from colonial times through the struggle for independence and
the eventual adoption of the Constitution of 1787. They especially and rightly identified
with the colonies struggle for independence. Thus, despite the naysaying of many
influential and powerful individuals, they saw their position as consistent with history
and tradition.
This sense of connection with history stretched back at least to the era of the
struggle for independence. While describing what he believed was the permanent,
sectional majority that the north had become in Congress, William Harper wrote,
“propose to the people of the South … that the States and people North of the Potomac
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and North-West of the Ohio, have right and power to make laws to bind them in all cases
whatsoever—and they foretell us the duration of … the Union.”85 This was language
borrowed from the Declaratory Act passed by Parliament in 1766, which declared that
Parliament had power “to make laws and statutes of sufficient force and validity to bind
the colonies and people of America, subjects of the crown of Great Britain, in all cases
whatsoever.”86 Calhoun also alluded to the Revolution in his phraseology. Speaking of
nullification, he said it would only be appropriate to resort to nullification if, “the
alternative would be submission and oppression on one side, or resistance by force on the
other.”87 This is the same language employed in the Declaration of the Causes and
Necessity of Taking Up Arms (1775): “We are reduced to the alternative of choosing an
unconditional submission to the tyranny of irritated minsters, or resistance by force.”88
By such language these South Carolinians were deliberately identifying with their
forbears who struggled against parliamentary abuses in the 1760s and 1770s.
An analysis of the nullifiers’ argument reveals that the struggle for independence
provided more than phrases and a surface-level association. Rather, the nullifiers had a
deep-seated ideological association regarding principles of representation and protection
with the colonists who threw off British rule. The essence of the colonial argument
against parliamentary taxation is summed up in The Declaration of Rights of the Stamp
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Act Congress (1765): “That it is inseparably essential to the freedom of a people, and the
undoubted rights of Englishmen, that no taxes should be imposed on them, but with their
own consent, given personally, or by their representatives.”89 The right to no taxation
without representation recognized that if an interested party was not acting as
representative, then there was nothing to prevent abusive taxation that would endanger
liberty.
Similarly, Calhoun stated, “It is a fundamental political principle, that the power
to protect can safely be confided only to those interested in protecting, or their
responsible agents.”90 He observed that the majority shapes and entirely controls the
federal government because the majority either directly or indirectly elects every member
of the government.91 Thus, the central government, if dominated by a permanent
majority, did not qualify as a protective institution since it was not in the central
government’s interest to protect the minority. Essentially, if instead of sharing common
cause with their constituents, “protectors” stood to benefit by an exploitation of their
charge, then disregard for rights could be expected. There is a common thread to these
two assertions. Both demand representation of the people in the affairs of government by
agents having common interests with their constituents.
Calhoun and many other southerners were convinced that the north had in fact
become a permanent sectional majority and therefore the federal government was unable
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to protect the south’s rights.92 Though the colonists literally had no representatives in
Parliament and southerners did have representation in Congress, the same principle
inspired the nullifiers that animated the founders. Just as the colonists could not be taxed
without representation, the south could not be protected without representation, and since
southerners were a permanent minority, they were in essence unrepresented in what was
supposed to be a protective body. Thus nullifiers saw themselves as having common
cause, that of being un-represented with the Patriots of Seventy-Six.
Clyde Wilson, professor emeritus at the University of South Carolina and editor
of The Papers of John C. Calhoun, observes the similarity between the situation of the
colonists’ struggle for independence and the perceived situation of South Carolinians. He
notes that Robert Turnbull convinced South Carolinians that they were being oppressed
by the central government; by oppression he meant “the taking from the citizens of what
was theirs by abuse of the authority that was delegated for the purpose of protecting the
citizens in the enjoyment of what was theirs.” He notes that the same belief motivated
Americans to pursue independence in response to a “trifling tax.”93 Speaking of South
Carolinians’ belief in their own oppression, Wilson states, “This was exactly the kind of
situation in which tradition called upon freemen to resist.”94 Just as their forefathers
faced unjust taxation at the hands of a distant power and thrown off the burden in an
effort to preserve liberty from power, South Carolinians roused themselves to counter this
intrusion of their sovereignty and danger to their liberty and prosperity. Thus the
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nullifiers acted consistently with historical precedent when they, believing themselves to
be oppressed by a legislative body in which they were essentially not represented, took
steps to protect their liberties and sovereignty.
Issues of protection and representation were inherently interwoven with the
broader contest between Hobbesian and Althusian conceptions of the constitution. The
Nullifiers were well aware of the similarity between their situation and that of their
forbears in the Revolution era. Their sense of connection to their history was both a
motivation of their actions and the source of many of their most compelling arguments
against the nationalists. Thus no matter the accusation, this republican theory must be
treated as a legitimate option to be tested rather than a mere chimera invented to meet
selfish ends. There is the simple and incontrovertible fact that as of the 1770s thirteen
distinct political communities existed in what would become the United States. During
the colonial era, these communities had never been a single entity either politically or
culturally.95
There is also plenty of room within the historical record to support the position
that these separate political communities of the colonies had never been merged into a
single political community throughout the founding era. The Declaration of
Independence did not indicate a common nationality as some argued but rather “the new
states were only united in the sense of an informal and non-legally binding collaboration
meant to achieve various common goals such as fighting for and recognizing their
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sovereign independence.”96 In the 18th century all nouns were still capitalized, and the
Declaration capitalized “States” but not “united.” Thus “united” was an adjective
describing the newly independent states’ solidarity in opposing their common foe,
England.97 As completely independent nations the states would have of course exercised
full sovereignty at this time.
The Articles of Confederation was the first legally binding combination of the
states. However, it scrupulously maintained the sovereignty of each member. Article II
stated: “Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every Power,
Jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the
United Sates, in Congress Assembled.”98 Hayworth notes that the listing the name of
each state in the document indicates that this was viewed as an international treaty
amongst independent nations.99 The nullifiers had a great deal of historical evidence from
the struggle for independence to support their belief that sovereignty resided in the people
of the several states.
Informed by this perception of American development, Calhoun believed that the
Constitution of 1787 had not changed the nature of the states nor their relation to each
other. He held that since the states preceded the central government, it “was created by
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their [the states’] agency.”100 He expressly rejected the idea that the states had forged
themselves into a single nation by ratifying the Constitution, since the convention
deliberately rejected the term “National” for the title of the Constitution and kept the
terminology of “United States.”101 Tracing the employment of the name “United States of
America” through the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation, and
the Constitution of 1787, he stated, “The retention of the same style, throughout every
stage of their existence, affords strong, if not conclusive evidence that the political
relation between these States, under their present constitution and government, is
substantially the same as under the confederacy and revolutionary government.” 102 Also,
he believed “the changes made by the present Constitution were not in the foundation but
in the superstructure of the system.”103 Calhoun’s interpretation of the historical fact that
the Constitution was ratified by state conventions differed significantly from Madison’s.
Whereas Madison and other nationalists believed that these conventions evidenced
ratification by the people as a whole, Calhoun put great emphasis upon the fact that they
were held at the state level. This meant to him that the people of the several states, the
same authority that had called the state government into existence, had given their
consent to the federal government.104
This last point is important in its details as it is often misunderstood and thought
to be a critical weakness in Calhoun’s theory. An insufficiently careful reading of
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Calhoun’s position can lead one to believe that he argued that the state governments had
created the central government as they had under the Articles of Confederation; it seems
Madison may have had this misunderstanding.105 Contributing to this conclusion is that
the compact theory of the union, in positing that the states created the union, can sound
very much like a simple confederacy, and indeed Calhoun regularly referred to the union
with such terminology. The fact that the people had in fact given sovereignty directly to
the central government was often proffered as a rebuttal of Calhoun’s theory that a single
state could nullify a federal law. However, Calhoun never asserted that the state
government and not the people had created the central government. Rather, he affirmed
the sovereignty of the people in creating the central government: “The people of the
States have, indeed, delegated a portion of their sovereignty, to be exercised conjointly by
a General Government, and have retained the residue to be exercised by their respective
States Governments.”106 On those occasions when Calhoun spoke of the States creating
the government he meant the people of the states, the true political community that is the
state, not the internal government each community established. If the union were a simple
confederacy, the state governments would have created the central government; however,
his recognition that the people directly invested authority in the central government when
they called it into being brings him closer to the Madisonian doctrine of split sovereignty.
Where Madison and Calhoun differ is not in their positions on the source of
authority but rather on the effect the Constitution had upon the sovereignty of the people.
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Madison believed that the Constitution created out of the several peoples, a single people
for “certain purposes.” Thus a single state could not nullify a national law, because it was
not the entire sovereign people that had created the union.107 Calhoun maintained that the
people of each state, in imparting authority to the central government and entering into a
pact with peoples of other states, had never surrendered their individual identity to
become part of a corporate whole. Therefore, each state never lost its individual
sovereignty: “to delegate is not to part with or to impair power. The delegated power in
the agent is as much the power of the principal as if it remained in the latter, and may, as
between him and his agent be controlled or resumed at pleasure.”108 Against the idea that
the Constitution itself had created a single people, he stated:
No such community ever existed as the people of the United States, forming a
collective body of individuals in one nation; and the idea that they are so untied
by the present Constitution as a social compact, as alleged by the proclamation, is
utterly false and absurd. To call the Constitution the social compact, is the
greatest possible abuse of language. No two things are more dissimilar; there is
not an expression in the whole science of politics, more perfectly definite in its
meaning than the social compact. It means that association of individuals,
founded on the implied assent of all its members, which precedes all Government,
and from which Government or the constitutional compact springs.109
Calhoun’s conception of the nature of a social compact made it impossible to suppose
that the Constitution was the social compact creating a single American people. Clearly,
Calhoun and the nullifiers were correct in their understanding of the historical source of
the central government’s power—elsewise Madison was also wrong. The differences
between the Father of the Constitution and Calhoun were thus on technical questions of
political science and the definitions of constitution and social contract. These are
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questions that simple historical inquiry cannot answer. What historical analysis does
show us though, is that Calhoun’s edifice of political science rested upon a sold historical
foundation.
The above observations do not exhaust the historical incidents Calhoun cited in
defense of his position. He noted that North Carolina and Rhode Island had refused to
ratify the Constitution till much later than the other states and for a time were considered
independent, foreign nations.110 If the people as a whole had ratified the Constitution then
even those states that had not ratified would have been compelled to join the union. Since
this historically was not the case, though, nullifiers believed that the states had
maintained sovereignty even under the Constitution of 1787. The fact that Virginia, New
York, and Rhode Island had provisions for secession in their ratification bills also
supports Calhoun’s belief that the states had maintained sovereignty.111 Calhoun’s theory
was not as radical as some believed; it flowed logically from certain premises that were
historically verifiable.
The nullifiers also saw their doctrine as being in the vein of Jeffersonian
Republicanism, rather than as a radical diversion from precedent. William Harper
appealed to Madison’s Report of 1799.112 The Report stated that sovereignty resided in
the people of the several states. It defined a state as “the people composing those political
societies, in their highest sovereign capacity” and declared, “the Constitution was
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submitted to the ‘states,’ … the ‘states’ ratified it; and, … they are consequently parties
to the compact, from which the powers of the federal government result.”113 Harper
esteemed Jefferson even higher than Madison, calling Jefferson the “master” of “a true
and thorough comprehension of the genius and working of our confederate system.”114 In
the Kentucky Resolutions, Jefferson expressed ideas incredibly similar to those espoused
by nullifiers:
…Where powers are assumed which have not been delegated, a nullification of
the act is the rightful remedy: that every State has a natural right… to nullify of
their own authority all assumptions of power by others within their limits: that
without this right they would be under the dominion, absolute and unlimited, of
whosoever might exercise this right of judgment for them: … [the States] alone
being parties to the compact, and solely authorized to judge the last resort of the
powers exercised under it, Congress being not a party, but merely the creature of
the compact, and subject as to its assumptions of power to the final judgment of
those by whom, and for whose use itself and its powers were all created and
modified…115
In the same document the Kentucky Legislature declared the Alien and Sedition Acts,
“not law, but … altogether void and of no force.”116 Here was the same idea of
sovereignty expressed by the nullifiers.117
Calhoun not only found justification for his position in these documents, he
believed a general and great constitutional crisis was already underway due to an
abandonment of the doctrines propounded in them. On January 12, 1833, he wrote to
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Bolling Hall, a former Representative form Georgia, “ Never did I dream that I would
live to see a change so great and deplorable. The Constitution is a dead letter; and in its
place is substituted the will of an unchecked, unlimited and interested majority.”118 The
next day he wrote to Samuel D. Ingham a former Secretary of the Treasury:
Who can look at this great and growing country, and not weep to see it sinking
into the lowest stage of political degeneracy? The fault is not with the people.
They are honest, industrious, intelligent and patriotic. It is to be found in our
departure from the great republican principles of [17]98; and thereby practically
converting our confederative system into a great consolidated government,
without limitation of powers or constitutional check.119
Calhoun expressed the belief that the nation had experienced a similar crisis in the 1790s
and believed the American experiment would have failed long before had not the election
of Jefferson set things to right. Calhoun said, “ But the time had at length come when we
are required to decide whether this shall be a confederacy any longer, or whether it shall
give way to a consolidated Government.”120 He believed that a reassertion of the
sovereignty and separateness – which he believed to be expressed in the Virginia and
Kentucky resolutions – of the several states was necessary to the preservation of the
liberty of the nation. Thus, not only did the nullifiers find support for their position in the
history of the nation’s founding but also in more recent history and republican tradition.
Madison was repulsed and disturbed however, to see his name brandished as an
authoritative propounder of the nullifiers’ position. His positions on political issues in the
1790s as a Democratic Republican party leader and especially his statements in the
118
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Virginia Resolutions of 1798 seemed to indicate that he was a supporter of the same
positions as the Nullifiers. However, Madison is a sort of enigma. Contrasting with some
of his incredibly states’ rights positions, he was ardently nationalist during the creation
and adoption of the Constitution of 1787 and again in the 1830s in response to
Nullification doctrine. This apparent undulation on Constitutional issues is a dominant
theme in Madisonian historiography. Many have found Madison to be at least
fundamentally consistent in his stance on these issues, but the historical community has
yet to reach consensus on this point.121
It is even harder to judge whether Jefferson would have actually supported such
policies because unlike Madison, he had died before his name was invoked by the
nullifiers and thus was unable to weigh in himself. Madison attempted to save his friend
from accusations of supporting such policies, but John Quincy Adams did indeed see him
as responsible for the nullification doctrine.122 He explicitly wrote to Edward Everett,
“Jefferson was the father of South Carolina Nullification, which points directly to the
dissolution of the union.”123 Not only did Jefferson appear to support strong states rights
doctrines in the Kentucky Resolution, but also late in life he had written letters to
Governor Giles of Virginia in which he spoke of secession from the union as a viable
option in cases of extreme need. In fairness to Jefferson he also stated within the same
121
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letter that “the States should be watchful to note every material usurpation on their rights
… to protest against them as wrongs to which our present submission shall be considered,
not as acknowledgments or precedents of right, but as a temporary yielding to the lesser
evil, until their accumulation shall overweigh that of separation.”124 This suggests that
perhaps such a protest is what he envisioned the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions to
be. However, this is not certain, especially considering the strong language of those
documents. Jefferson’s statements in this letter, while leaving no doubt that he thought
secession legitimate in extreme circumstances, leave open the possibility that he thought
of secession not as a constitutional right, but as an undeniable natural right integrally
related to the natural right to rebellion. If the latter was his intention, Jefferson was in
essential agreement with Madison on this topic.125 His talk of enduring usurpation with
peaceful protest seems to weaken claims the nullifiers have on him as a supporter of their
doctrine.
However, despite the outright denunciation of Madison and the questionability of
Jefferson’s support, the nullifiers were not out of order to believe the Virginia and
Kentucky Resolutions and Reports supported their position. If nothing else, the premises
of those documents and Calhoun’s theory of Nullification were the same at least in so far
that they held to a compact nature of the union. The Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions
expressed the same Althusian conception Jefferson had argued for in The Summary View
of the Rights of British America and ensured that such conceptions were firmly carried
into the national period. The structure of the premises and arguments of the documents of
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‘98 left room for an honest interpreter to come to Calhoun’s conclusions from them.126 In
that Madison, Jefferson, and Calhoun all started with the same foundational historical
facts, the nullifiers’ reliance on the Spirit of ‘98 was reasonable and legitimately added a
degree of historical support to their position even if it only provided an authoritative
refutation of the sort of nationalism that claimed the people of the United States formed
the nation as a single people.
In the early 1830s Calhoun summarized the entire nature of the question before
the United States when he stated, “Stripped of all its covering, the naked question is,
whether ours is a federal or a consolidated government; a constitutional or absolute one; a
government resting ultimately on the solid basis of the sovereignty of the States, or on the
unrestrained will of a majority…”127 As demonstrated, this position was grounded in a
political theory fundamentally different from that of the unitary political theory of
nationalists. That the same dichotomy of political theory between the Hobbesian and
Althusian state existed in the 1760s and 1770s demonstrates a continuity of this struggle
between dispersed and consolidated political theories in American politics. This obvious
chain releases the nullifiers from accusations of being mere reactionaries and places them
in the same tradition as Jefferson and the American Revolution.
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